Crack acl 2.2.x zip file download

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  1. Crack acl 2.2.x zip file download
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  79. This will either be tcp or udp. Requests The total number of requests handled by the WAF shows all requests, whether they were blocked or not. The password that is used to check the LDAP server.
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  81. Only works with BIND8, and is still rather experimental. To get the controller ID, run the getsdncontroller command. The Audit All option is not recommended for use in normal operation.
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  83. Software Packages in - If the Real Server is on a subnet, the subnet address of the LoadMaster will be used.
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  85. We need to be able to access the SIM card filesystem in order to work some magic while collecting relevant and necessary network data, not available from AOS API. There may be many ways to read the file system on a SIM card. We have previously looked at the possibility of using the modem AT command interface, but we need other alternatives in those cases when baseband does not present an available and proper AT command interface. But 1 is risking to use non-available or OEM dependent STK. Thus 2 might actually be a better choice, from simplicity point of view.... If you have any better or further insight, please let us know ASAP! References: Want to back this issue? We accept bounties via. The approaches for extracting Kc and TMSI I found use AT+CSIM command to issue raw APDUs. We can't send APDUs to the SIM, because AT-commands like +CSIM are not supported in Android. It is necessary to modify the RIL to make them work, which is what Seek for Android does. SIM IO commands in android are issued using +CRSM, look into reference-ril. We can't use STK because we can't install JavaCard applets onto SIM without a key, which only the operator of the SIM has. You can only install an applet if you have a developer SIM where you know the key or if you have somehow the luck to get a SIM where you don't need the key. So I looked into +CRSM command to see how it works and what it can do. We use this command already to obtain the ciphering indicator. I managed to read TMSI and LAI. For T3212 value I got 00. Other parameters should specify the record number and length of response. I'm guessing you have a 3G sim. Refer to 'Table 10. Identifier Name Length 6FAD Administrative 3 6F38 Service Table 4 6F07 IMSI 9 6F7B Forbidden PLMN 12 6F7E TMSI LAI 11 6F20 Kc, n 9 6F30 PLMN Selector 24 6F74 BCCH Information 16 6F78 Access Control 2 AT+CRSM - Restricted SIM access By using this command instead of Generic SIM Access +CSIM TE application has easier but more limited access to the SIM database. Set command transmits to the ME the SIM and its required parameters. ME handles internally all SIM-ME interface locking and file selection routines. As response to the command, ME sends the actual SIM information parameters and response data. ME error result code +CME ERROR may be returned when the command cannot be passed to the SIM, but failure in the execution of the command in the SIM is reported in and parameters. Coordination of command requests to SIM and the ones issued by GSM application inside the ME is implementation dependent. However the TE should be aware of the precedence of the GSM application commands to the TE commands. ME handles internally all SIM-ME interface locking and file selection routines. As response to the command, ME sends the actual SIM information parameters and response data. Parameters: - command passed on by the ME to the SIM 176 - READ BINARY 178 - READ RECORD 192 - GET RESPONSE 214 - UPDATE BINARY 220 - UPDATE RECORD 242 - STATUS - identifier of an elementary data file on SIM. Mandatory for every command except STATUS. Note: this command requires PIN authentication. However commands READ BINARY and READ RECORD can be issued before PIN authentication and if the SIM is blocked after three failed PIN authentication attempts to access the contents of the Elementary Files. Note: use only decimal numbers for parameters , , , and. References CRSM Examples for CRSM commands: No APDU support: Most RIL radio interface layer implementation for Android is relying on the +CRSM restricted SIM access AT command for providing SIM IO service. I was wondering if anyone knows a Android RIL implementation and platform that does use something other than +CRSM like +CSIM, or some other type of raw SIM access. AT commands can be seen in 3gpp 27. The amount of phones supporting this is very limited, according to some people older Siemens and Alcatel phones let you do this. Seek for Android: Communication with the SIM card is provided by the baseband processor over AT commands e. AT+CPIN, AT+CRSM defined by 3GPP 27. In order to access card applications on the SIM card like any other Secure Element using the SmartcardAPI the baseband processor must provide some additional AT commands to enable transparent APDU exchange. For security reasons the APDU exchange must be limited to logical channels between the Android world and the card applications. The basic channel of the UICC must be reserved to the baseband processor. The 3GPP TS 27. The AT+CSIM command transmits the command APDU to the SIM card, and returns the response APDU to the caller. This command allows exchange of any APDU, and should be handled with great care. The baseband must limit the range of command APDUs to the essential needs. The RIL implementation on current Android phones do not support the required AT commands. For this reason the UICC patch includes an emulator extension emulator. On real devices, the proprietary RIL library is very restrictive in terms of APDU access to the SIM or STK support and normally needs to be extended. This allows to improve the security of Android apps by using the SIM as a secure element and both store sensitive data and implement critical functionality inside it. Commercial SIM do not allow for installing arbitrary user applications, but applets can be automatically loaded by the carrier using the SIM OTA mechanism and apps that take advantage of those applets can be distributed through regular channels, such as the Play Store. I guess we are going to see more device that work with UICC as more carrier-driven payment services are rolled out. Still, I don't think you will have access to the Card Manager keys for a 'real' operator SIM. What SIM are you using? In order to do the authentication, you have to know the card issuer keys. There is a limit number of attempt to authenticate. Usually this number is 10. If you exceed this limit, the card will block. Once you do a successfully authentication this limit is reset. Vodafone UK do not allow any third party to load any SIM Toolkit applications to any of their SIM cards. This is also 1 for most Vodafone companies around the world but please check with your local company for confirmation. The main reasons for this are: 1 The SIM card belongs to Vodafone and is a secure device that is protecting our revenue. Applications on the SIM could compromise this security. I have a USIM which has an other file structure. Another interesting file which has BCCH info is , it needs also more research to find out how to read it. It's a little more complicated. There can be multiple applications on the SIM UICC which have different file structures. USIM was developed for 3G networks. The USIM brought, among other things, security improvements like the mutual authentication and longer encryption keys and an improved address book. If the SIM is not too old it should have USIM support. I simply used MTK engineer app to send commands and logcat to read the response. But we had already the discussions about how to send AT commands and I'm sure every Android RIL should have support for +CRSM command. Reading the ciphering indicator works, but the command for enabling the ciphering indicator doesn't change anything. So the question is how to write to the SIM using +CRSM command. The reason is that the. So we can't do this without having a special key, which only the operator has. The same problem as with installing javacard applets. You need a JavaCard or whatever else they call them and copy your original card to it, including keys etc. For this you need special SIM MiTM tools. This, however, is out far beyond what we're trying to do here. We only want to read the SIM files already mentioned above. You're using the MTK based modem, which are more properly corresponding to AT Command set 3GPP standards, therefore you have no problem reading EFs using +CRSM. The SIM Card is performing security checks to prevent this. Have you tried injectord? The thing with PIN2 is not a problem because PIN2 can be NULL. Android's telephony layer already has SIM file access, for example issues the READ BINARY command with a file ID and size, as you are doing with AT commands. It's probably not exposed to normal apps, but this app requires root, right? Seems like it should be easier to gain access to these code paths, than implementing modem-specific stuff for all the vendors. Once it gets down to the closed-source RIL libraries, they probably issue AT commands, but I don't see why you need to know how that works in order to use it from Java. Or have you tried these API's, and maybe access to the files you want is restricted by the RIL? Sorry if I'm not suggesting anything new, or this conversation is out of date. Thanks for your input. What you're seeing is a rather clueless and desperate development team, who's trying to figure out how to access the EF files mentioned below. We haven't even tried to use the internal functions, since we simply do not know how to use them properly. So this conversation is certainly not out of date. Ha, well I feel clueless too, as I've now realized how hard my idea would be to do. I'm pretty sure those objects are living in the com. It would be one thing to define some reflection wrappers to get ahold of otherwise-hidden classes, it's another to cross the process boundary and invoke stuff inside another VM. I think an might allow us to inject some code into that process, but would you want to have that dependency? Something to think about. I will start with SEEK, because CyanogenMod 11 is supposed to support SEEK and I have that. If it does work, it would probably be the most stable way to go, but it won't be supported on all devices. We could then try adding the RIL socket request method, or Xposed injection, as a fallback for devices without SEEK. Yes, we just had an Xposed discussion. We like Xposed very much, but we are worried about this code dependence, and would like to avoid it if possible. In addition, we still don't understand their code or how to implement it in our case. In addition, we were also hoping to be able to run our App on stock firmware without root, in the future, and Xposed requires root. But so far no particular clarity or success. I'm trying to get some help on the , but so far no breakthrough, and things are moving too slow. I see in your SEEK post that you apparently have its SmartcardService installed, so hopefully that's at least one other person who can test anything I manage to produce. Right, those APIs are not part of the public API. We could use them with reflection or API. The benefit of using the telephony classes is that they already handle the parsing, and a bit of structure for different types of SIMs. Perhaps once I get something working, I'll be able to strip down the telephony classes to only require what we need. But what are you saying here? Right, those APIs are not part of the public API. We could use them with reflection or API. From my logcat in that SEEK thread, it seem that something is indeed working but not finding something else... But you need signup there, so you can get hundreds of of other documents. That kind of works to some extent. See: For easy access you can of above, consisting of: OMAPIsuite. Please download and try this! We may learn something from it... But what are you saying here? Right, those APIs are not part of the public API... I mean it's not as straightforward as I originally thought, because you can't simply re-use those objects in the app, since the RIL is in another process. I'm trying to adapt the classes to SEEK, though. Stock ROMs don't offer a SmartCard API so you can't communicate with the SIM card. I don't know how prevalent stock support is, but at least. Still I'm optimistic about Android 5's new API. Ok, either I'm very confused here, or you are, but more likely all of us. We're just trying to read from SIM card. Every phone obviously supports some kind of SIM card reading and access mechanisms. We just have to find out to what extent this has been standardized, and try to hook into it, or find out how RIL is communicating with it, and try to circumvent any restrictions. All what they have done there, is making some of the already existing binary code available to the AOS API. The SIMAlliance's Open Mobile API OMAPI seem to be the current and future way of UICC communication. So if you have a stock device, please try to install and run the app I posted and let me know what happens. It should go through an arsenal of ~100 tests and present the results. In addition the source code, used for each test is shown in the app. That app probably requires the device to use the SmartcardService: org. On my phone this arsenal seem to pass most tests, but not all, so something is working. On my Samsung S4 mini GT-I9195 I have the following SIM related packages: Package Version Path SIM Toolkit 4. So what I'm saying here, is that there must be a smarter way to do this than compiling AOS from sources, just to get SEEK to work, so we can read a damn simple EF card. I've seen that post as well, look very promising. They provide code and explanation. In addition, some guy also post code on both and. And with the post explaining how to , we should be able to write an idiot-proof PoC app that does, only one thing. For example, reading the EF-LOCI file. We can then use this to extend functionality on other models and phones using other standards. Finally implementing it into our app. I know we don't do authentication but I searched for a list of devices which have Open Mobile API available, which they mention there because it enables communication with a Secure Element and SIM cards are Secure Elements. I don't have a device where the SmartCard Service is installed, so PerformenceTester. I assume only a small number of devices offers them. If the device offers Open Mobile API then you can use it to communicate with the SIM card. See the commit message at the top for rundown of what it does and needs to do. I suggest we keep discussion about that code on its commit page, to keep this thread clear. Some good information here. Nice spotting the Android 5 API -- we could use it when it's available, but it would be nice to have fallbacks too. So, I found that the OpenMobile service in CyanogenMod 11 is , and I couldn't get it to build when I enabled it. Seems to depend on some closed-source stuff that CM doesn't handle right now. However, stock Android 4. I tried out the test apps. I guess it's a mismatch between the version it was built for, and what I have. The service APK's version is 3. The OMAPISuite seems to work, as well as it can. We can't really depend on that. Even then, it might not grant us access to the SIM's actual GSM application, which is what we want. Interestingly, , so maybe some of you have an older version that won't enforce it. You can try out the disabled OpenMobile code in my patch linked at the top. Nice find on the UICCTester. It gives me the same access-denied error, though. Requires root and SEEK but not OpenMobile service , and probably adjustment of the user ID that calls the service. I know the phone number isn't very exciting, but it was the easy test case, and I don't have more time tonight to try others. It should be fairly straightforward to read the other files now... Unfortunately, I'm thinking root is an unavoidable requirement for reading these files, unless some devices allow access through the OpenMobile API, or someone figures out how my test of that was flawed there's disabled code for it in my last commit. Or maybe there are less-privileged vendor-specific ways. There is no way to do this reliably, unless you are using a custom ROM and are running as system or some other privileged user. The OpenMobile API won't allow you to open a basic channel it's reserved for the phone application , and even if you manage to open a logical channel you are subject to access control restrictions. The rules are encoded in the SIM, so you can't change them. You can only patch OpenMobile to ignore them, again back to custom ROM. If you tried really hard, you could probably get a root daemon started on boot ala SuperSU and pipe commands to it via a local socket. But this would be a giant hack, probably device dependent also. Access to the daemon might be subject on SELinux restrictions on newer devices and be blocked though. If you tried even harder, you could write a privileged native Binder service ala keystore and access it through Binder. But that's basically installing a backdoor on your device, again back to custom ROM. Not clear what the end goal is here, but even if you got reliable file read access, you still won't be able to read protected files. This will obviously fail on MNO provided SIM cards as we do not have the key to install to those. So don't expect all tests to pass, unless you have a developer JavaCard or whatever they call them. The permission denied issue is lightly related to the issue above, and is almost the same problem as I had when trying to run PerformanceTester. Having root is one of our requirements. Sounds like we are on the same page about PKCS 15 stuff preventing the OpenMobile API from being useful to us. However, that doesn't rule out the SEEK telephony service call. You have to run it as the user that owns the OpenMobile service package. The good news is that it does no further access checks, so we circumvent the PKCS 15 stuff! It should work without modification on any device with root and the OpenMobile service, including CM11. I've tested on Xperia Z1 Compact with stock and CM11. I haven't had a chance to re-test on stock, but the technique was working, and if there's something wrong, it should just be a matter of tweaking the configuration-sniffing stuff. Thanks for bringing your knowledge and experience to our issue discussion. Your write: You can only patch OpenMobile to ignore them, again back to custom ROM. Can you not patch this without custom ROMs? Well, if you already have SuperSU as we assume , then why add another one? What would that daemon do? Access to the daemon might be subject on SELinux restrictions on newer devices and be blocked though. Another project of mine is looking into how to inject SELinux policies... Is this similar to how Xposed does it? Not clear what the end goal is here, but even if you got reliable file read access, you still won't be able to read protected files. Which files are those? I doubt the files we're interested in are read protected. With root, we should be able to start it up under. This would still depend on that call existing in the phone service, which I think is not a standard part of Android, though it should be there on devices that support the OpenMobile API. Dealing with a proper privileged service could be a lot of work though, so for now I'll probably hold off. That has the advantage of not requiring SEEK, nor depending on vendor extensions. Hopefully they don't modify the Java RIL too much, or this would be brittle too. Everything is brittle these days, and the only ones breaking stuff is Google, so our code is never safe! That said, I think what you suggest above is just fine. What kind of work is required to make it privileged? Well, part of the problem is, I don't know what would be required to launch the service from our app, running under a specific Linux user ID which is required to get through the access check in the service call. Maybe there will ultimately be a security restriction we can't get around. It's a Binder service I'm calling, so pretty easy to access from Java, the issue with doing that from our app is just the user ID requirement. I started considering some way to spawn a little app that runs under the special user ID and proxies messages between us and the telephony service, then I realized: that's basically what the OpenMobile service does but gets in the way with access checks , so why not re-use most of it? Anyway, I think for now I'd rather just use this relatively simple hack that works for me at least , so we can develop the idea and see what's possible with reading the files, then consider making it more robust later. Please do not add untested code. I've already tested above, and it breaks the rest of the app on my I9195 device. Like I said before:... For example, reading the EF-LOCI file. We can then use this to extend functionality on other models and phones using other standards. Finally implementing it into our app. So let's try to move the relevant new code into a new app that does only that. This is what Illarionov did for the scraper, that we then implemented. That would make multi-device testing very easy and clear. Please have another look at issue , in particular post and links. Let me comment on the library, openmobileapi as specified by the Sim Alliance. As mentioned above it was part of seek project, thus available only in AOSP based Android distros. There are some phone manufacturers like samsung or sony that have included this library on production devices for various trials mostly payment and transport use cases. Unfortunately there is also UICC access control system in place to verify HASH of signer of the app is registered to access particular AID on sim card see globalplatform device specification site. This code actually requires the HASH of cert signer of app on phone to be stored on UICC and verified by the System java library controlling the open logical channel. Therefore better way to access secure store is actully to use HW backed secureElement i. There is one other way, use two phones and so called RSAP or SAP. It is used by GSM modules in cars to access GSM ALGO 2g or 3g inside owners phone, while disabling the GSM inside the phone meanwhile. Other option is transfer of identity legaly. Such case could be solved by eSE remote perso or swap perso using bootstrap perso - long term of big fruit company. Could improve user experience but raises other issues. Hello , thanks for joining. To me that sound like you're talking about an SE applet, and I fail to see the connection of reading and running SE applets with just reading EF files like LOCI, FPLMN etc. Are you saying those files are protected? If so, then it doesn't rhyme with either or 's recent progress of reading those files. You can only do that reliably via an OTA package in recovery like how SuperSU is installed , but this, of course, requires an unlocked bootloader. If you don't care about this, you should be able to get your app working with a patched SmartcardService. There might be differences in different devices though, so you have to account for that. You will be able to specify the user the service runs as, so you can choose one that is allowed to connect to telephony and read the SIM. You cannot inject SELinux polices without modifying the boot image, which is another can of worms. Once you do this, you are getting even closer to a custom ROM... Sorry, but we're all new to this. What the SmartCardService does is read the access rules from the SIM and compare the certificate of each client application with the one in the rules. That is why vendor apps work because their signing certificate is referenced in the access rules, on the SIM , and 'homebrew' ones get access denied. When reading a file from UICC, you are actually talking to file serving app, which means you are selecting AID of that file serving app. Actually there are multiple aproaches to reach the UICC, AT commands is just one of them, but there are also pipes and binary commands doing the same depending on how the control channel to the UICC is established. PKCS 15 contains besides Java SATSA, Android AC also Certs and keys - thus interesting for other uses. Thus some structures might be available without AC because those are used for AC itself yes it is weird! All that depends on how good design and modularization was done in the OS, actually user app should never get access to the files directly, unfortunately either rooting or poor design could cause to cause failure to those attempt to protect the UICC against malicious attacks. There is also one funny thing. It is called basic and logical channel. But the ISO 7816 was enhanced with so called logical channel that extended the ability to select multiple applets on sim while running multiple OS applications but still limited to few 3-16 depending on setup and card manufacturer. The worst message comes that applets cannot be usually selected twice. Thus as many things is handled through single applet even attempt to access such applet while being in use by GSM modem auth algo or so might cause either fail of both or fail of your app or unpredictable behavior... I've uploaded a bunch of SIM related GP documents to download. What does that mean? I think you're referring to the Qualcom QMI interface, and trying to use that to read USIM, but if we have that, then we don't need to read SIM, as all we need is present in that API. So yes, we're interested in looking into that very soon... Ok, so apart from trying option 2 or 3 from Nikolay, it seems rather futile trying this, while other experiments seem to show some possibility... So what would you suggest doing? There is currently no portable way to do this. Device-specific and probably not documented standard AT commands may not work on all devices. Doing this with TelephonyService might be quite dangerous though, because it doesn't have a stable interface and vendors customize. SmartCardService is similar, but lower risk. I've essentially written Option 2, targeting TelephonyService. This was the most straightforward way I could think to do a Binder call under another UID. It's messy, but it's pretty stable for me on a stock ROM or CyanogenMod 11. I don't think it's worked for anyone else, though, and I haven't gotten to the bottom of that yet... I'm now tinkering with using to inject code into com. This way could be really unstable, but it's fun to experiment with at least. It seem that development on this topic has stopped completely. Perhaps we could have a status update from and , who was working on this? If not, perhaps could have some valuable knowledge about how to get this working? In addition we may need the following permissions to be able to use the NFC device path to get to SE. I have a solution with ddi injecting into the com. It's been tested on 3-5 phones. As I recall, on one it silently fails injecting logs show part of the process working, then no further logs and the SIM file reading doesn't work; I was stumped by this several weeks ago and haven't looked at it again. I also have a report and maybe seen for myself a time or two that it doesn't work for the first time, but does if the test activity is re-launched. This may just be a timing issue, of not waiting long enough between injecting and trying to call the new service. I am thinking I will have the injected code signal back to the application when it's ready, which could help. In theory it could work on all pre-Lollipop devices I assume ART breaks ddi with root, but may need adjustment on some versions, or for vendors that change the telephony code such as Mediatek, which is accounted for in the current code. So, we've got something working, but it needs more polishing, and I haven't really had the time or insight to do it yet. If we get AT commands working robustly on most devices, we might implement SIM file reading on top of that instead. Joey, Was that on my phone? Did you try it on other Samsungs? If we get AT commands working robustly on most devices, we might implement SIM file reading on top of that instead. We will use both and more. We'll have to use whatever is available on the device AIMSICD is running on, and for whatever stuff we want to look at. I currently do not have anything technical to add yet beyond the great work and opinions expressed here. But wanted to add some other thoughts. It is hard now to access the SIM directly, and will surely get harder. The SIM is sometimes used as a secure element for things like 2FA precisely because it is hard for malware to access it, so it is in the user's interest for Google to protect access to it. So I think a lot of energy will be burned trying to find and maintain workarounds for a menagerie of handsets. Another option is to select one or a few devices that will be fully researched and developed for, and every year or so select the next device in the upgrade path. Selection criteria would highly rate any device which is more easily hackable, such as MTK based. The energy saved could be better spent developing new features and making a more complete solution. One downside is that the target device might not be your daily driver, and while it can operate as a standalone solution, you might need to discover if your daily driver is being specifically targeted with IMSI selection.
  86. Multiple logoff strings can be specified by using a space-separated list. Something to think about. I doubt the files we're interested in are read protected. You can also print a port number, if necessary. When this option is enabled - in addition to checking the validity of the client certificate, the client certificate will also be checked against the altSecurityIdentities ASI attribute of the user on the Active Directory. When this option is enabled, updated rules are met on a daily basis from KEMP. The amount of phones supporting this is very limited, according to some people older Siemens and Alcatel phones let you do this. The user bal naturally has access to all functionality; other users have access to the subsystems that have been assigned to them using the LoadMaster permissions.
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